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THE LEFT SIDE OF ANTITRUST: WHAT
FAIRNESS MEANS AND WHY IT
MATTERS
EDWIN J. HUGHES*
I. INTRODUCrION
Antitrust law is out of whack. Like other areas of the law, the doc-
trines of antitrust have historically reflected a tension between claims of
allegedly wronged individuals and broader societal interests. On the one
hand, antitrust plaintiffs invoke the law to remedy what they assert to be
various forms of damaging and unfair competition. The interest in re-
dressing particular acts of wrongdoing is referred to here as the left side
of antitrust law. On the other hand, the principles of antitrust law are
also designed to promote a market structure conducive to the efficient
allocation of resources. This concern for efficiency is referred to here as
the right side of the law.
The tension between concern for the victims of unfair business tactics
and deference toward the type of vigorous competition that is the hall-
mark of an efficient market kept antitrust law on a roughly forward
course for many years. But over the past fifteen years or so, an exclusive
concern for economic efficiency has caused the law to tilt perilously to
the right. Many courts have jettisoned concern for the individual com-
petitor as an appropriate consideration of antitrust. As a result, unre-
strained deference to a robust and free-swinging competitive process has
come to dominate antitrust analysis and to doom most antitrust claims.
Plaintiffs, to their regret, have recently found many new ways to lose
an antitrust case. For example, a discounting retailer challenging a ter-
mination can show that its supplier simply caved-in to the threats of a
more powerful dealer upset about price competition. However, the
plaintiff will lose unless it can also show that the supplier and com-
plaining dealer had reached an agreement on prices to be charged by the
dealer after the termination.'
* Attorney, Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, Wisconsin; Lecturer, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. 1974, Georgetown University; J.D. 1978, University of
Chicago Law School. Thanks to Brian E. Butler, Peter C. Carstensen, James A. May, Robert
Pitofsky, Richard A. Posner, Neil E. Roberts, and Judy L. Whalley for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
1. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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A plaintiff may allege that a rival has attempted to monopolize a
market by procuring through fraud on the Patent Office a patent on a
process originally developed by the plaintiff. However, if the patent
would have been issued to the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant's
conduct, the plaintiff's antitrust claim fails no matter what the defendant
did. Courts will reason that antitrust law does not attach significance to
which party exploits the monopoly that the patent confers.2
A plaintiff can convince a jury that a rival with deeper pockets at-
tempted to drive it out of business by slashing its prices below its costs.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff will lose unless it can also show that its rival
had a reasonable prospect of later recouping its losses by charging
supracompetitive prices.
Courts' recent hostility toward private antitrust claims is largely a
consequence of the vacuum where the left side of antitrust should be.
The wealth of scholarly interest in the efficiency consequences of anti-
trust doctrine has not been matched by concomitant attention to the is-
sues of why and under what circumstances plaintiffs in antitrust suits
have legitimate claims to the law's protections, regardless of the actions'
effects on the market. With no effective counterweight to the well-de-
veloped concern for efficiency in antitrust enforcement, the law has been
pulled so far to the right that it is nearly at the point of turning back on
itself. Antitrust law is becoming so permissive as to be irrelevant.
The impact of the diminishing left side of antitrust can best be appre-
ciated by first distinguishing the three spheres of antitrust. The first
sphere encompasses enforcement of the per se prohibition against price-
fixing agreements. The principal activity of this sphere is criminal and
civil prosecution of bid-rigging and other types of price-fixing arrange-
ments. This sphere bears more resemblance to other areas of the law
that focus on white-collar crime than to the other two spheres of anti-
trust. Because price fixing is the one antitrust prohibition that is widely
supported by adherents of a market structure approach to antitrust, the
weakened state of the left side of the law has had little practical effect on
the first sphere.
The second sphere of antitrust entails rules that govern cooperation
and consolidation among substantial business entities. The issues in this
sphere involve mergers, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and inter-
national application of the antitrust laws. This sphere of the law places
2. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985).
3. E.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
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more emphasis on industrial policy and international competition than
the other two. Because the fairness concerns of individual competitors
are generally remote from the market structure issues that dominate the
second sphere, the left side of the law also has a small effect on the
second sphere.
While the first two spheres regulate cooperative undertakings, the
third sphere of antitrust is concerned with claims that firms were treated
unfairly by their suppliers or competitors. Allegations involving price
discrimination, vertical restraints, dealer terminations, and group boy-
cotts are common in this sphere. The issues in the third sphere have
more in common with those involving unfair competition and other busi-
ness torts than with the concerns of the first two spheres. Because the
pull of the left side of antitrust is most pronounced in the third sphere,
that sphere has been most affected by the law's tilt to the right and is in
danger of disappearing.
Although the right side of antitrust has been shaped by economic
reasoning, the right side does not indiscriminately embrace whatever in-
sights economic analysis generates. It is not the economic approach, but
the approach invoked in service to a particular narrow vision of the law,
that defines the right side of antitrust.
The courts' treatment of the concept of opportunistic behavior illus-
trates the right side's selective use of economic insights. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes the concept more often than any other
court and is in the vanguard of the courts applying an approach to the
law grounded in economic analysis. The reason is simple. The court is
home to Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, two acknowl-
edged leaders of the field who, during their tenures at the University of
Chicago Law School, developed many of the insights that guide the
approach.
The concept of opportunistic behavior is based on the insight that
contractual performance is usually not simultaneous. Because it is not,
occasions arise where one party is in a position to attempt to exploit the
investment that the other party has sunk in performance in order to
strike a better deal. For example:
If A contracts to build a highly idiosyncratic gazebo for B, pay-
ment due on completion, and when A completes the gazebo B
refuses to pay, A may be in a bind-since the resale value of the
gazebo may be much less than A's cost-except for his right to
sue B for the price. Even then, a right to sue for breach of con-
tract, being costly to enforce, is not a completely adequate rem-
edy. B might therefore go to A and say, "If you don't reduce
1994]
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your price I'll refuse to pay and put you to the expense of suit";
and A might knuckle under. If such modifications are allowed,
people in B's position will find it harder to make such contracts in
the future, and everyone will be worse off.4
According to Judge Posner, "[T]he fundamental function of contract law
(and recognized as such at least since Hobbes' day) is to deter people
from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting partners."5
The Seventh Circuit has invoked the danger of opportunistic behav-
ior in a broad range of contractual and quasi-contractual contexts. For
example, the concept has provided the basis for the court's efforts to
define the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in contract law,6 to
identify the distinguishing characteristics of business relationships pro-
tected by state dealer statutes,7 and to describe constraints upon firing
employees who are terminable at will.8
One might think that this reasoning would also be utilized in third-
sphere antitrust cases, which frequently involve claims of abuse of an
ongoing business relationship. However, the same economics-oriented
judges who willingly invoke this reasoning in other areas of the law resist
it here. This tendency is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent anti-
trust decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.9
The point of interest here is Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia, a
former University of Chicago Law School colleague of Judges Posner
and Easterbrook and Justice Department colleague of Robert Bork, has
emerged among the justices as the most reliable spokesperson for the
economic approach. In his Kodak dissent, Justice Scalia recognized that
the situation challenged by the plaintiffs could give rise to opportunistic
behavior. However, he denied that this danger is relevant to antitrust
claims. Instead, Justice Scalia stated that this sort of "circumstantial
power" is, in the words of an opinion written by Judge Posner, "a brief
4. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 91 (4th ed. 1992) (footnote
omitted).
6. E.g., Original Great Am. Choc. Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992); Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595
(7th Cir. 1991).
7. E.g., Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 135 (7th Cir. 1990) (Indiana
franchise statute); Kenosha Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 895 F.2d 418, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Wisconsin dealership statute); Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 1987) (Wis-
consin dealership statute).
8. E.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 901 (1988).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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perturbation in competitive conditions-not the sort of thing the anti-
trust laws do or should worry about."'"
In the third sphere of antitrust, attempts to exploit circumstantial
power are far more common than attempts to exploit monopoly power
resulting from domination of a properly defined market. The effect on
the victim of the exploitation is the same, regardless of the source of the
power. The next section of this Article explores the reasons why the
"Chicago School" economic approach seeks to dramatically shrink the
third sphere of antitrust by removing from the law's domain the most
common occasions for the exercise of power.
This Article then describes shortcomings in the Chicago School ap-
proach, both in its theory and its implications. Next, in an attempt to
help revitalize the left side of antitrust, competitive fairness is proposed
as an appropriate counterweight to economic efficiency in deciding
third-sphere cases. This Article concludes with a discussion of how
courts could balance the interests of fairness and efficiency in third-
sphere cases in ways that are manageable, predictable, and more faithful
to the animating principles behind the antitrust laws.
II. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
A. The Chicago School Approach as Theory
Two interrelated factors account for the contraction of the third
sphere. The first is increased judicial acceptance that the exclusive goal
of antitrust law is to further what economists call consumer welfare. The
second is increased judicial reliance upon profit maximization theories in
antitrust litigation. These factors yield a closed system of mutual justifi-
cation that tends to mask the unreality of the enterprise and its lack of
historical and political legitimacy.
1. The System of Economic Analysis
a) Consumer Welfare as the Exclusive Goal of Antitrust
Courts that have aggressively ruled in ways that shrink the third
sphere of antitrust have described the exclusive goal of antitrust law to
be "consumer welfare," as economists understand the term. According
to this view, the sole purpose of the law is to promote the most efficient
ordering of the market for the benefit of consumers. The market is ar-
ranged efficiently when resources have gravitated to those who value
10. Id at 2098 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228,236
(7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989)).
1994]
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them most, with value understood to mean willingness and ability to
pay." Hence, antitrust law should attack impediments to market
efficiency. 12
How the courts have come to accept consumer welfare as the exclu-
sive goal of antitrust is a story of an academic theory seized upon and
exploited for political ends. Robert Bork provided the justification for
judicial acceptance, the Supreme Court in the 1960s and early 1970s un-
wittingly provided the opportunity, and the Reagan Administration pro-
vided the momentum.
The story begins in Chicago in the 1950s. Aaron Director, a profes-
sor of economics at the University of Chicago Law School, began to ana-
lyze business behavior condemned by antitrust through the lens of price
theory. Director's analysis showed that many practices condemned by
antitrust law could promote efficiency. Director's method of analysis
proved fruitful, and many of his students and colleagues continued his
work.13
As the Chicago School analysis was developing, antitrust analysis in
the courts was proceeding down a quite different path. Throughout the
1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court issued a series of antitrust
decisions that only plaintiffs' lawyers could love. The 1960s were salad
days for antitrust plaintiffs. Not only did the Court invariably identify a
basis for antitrust liability, at times the Court also announced rules far
more expansive than any of the parties had urged.' 4
11. POSNER, supra note 5, at 13.
12. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. Rnv. 1, 1 (1984).
13. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
925, 925-26 (1979). Robert Bork has described Director as "the seminal thinker in antitrust
economics and industrial organization." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANrRUsT PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF at ix (1978) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST PARADOX]. Although
Director did not publish much, Posner identifies the following articles as elaborations of ideas
formulated by Director: Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal
History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 157 (1954); Ward S. Bowman, Jr.,
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); John S. McGee, Pred-
atory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Lester G. Telser,
Why Should Manufacturers Want Free Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). Posner, supra, at 926
n.2.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967); FrC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966). In Von's Grocery and Schwinn, the Court adopted rules
for mergers and vertical territorial restraints that were broader than the Justice Department
had sought. Posner has explained these decisions as an effort by the Court to strengthen the
hand of the antitrust enforcement agencies:
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The Supreme Court's antitrust decisions during this period were un-
usually vulnerable to criticism that they were result-oriented and unprin-
cipled. 5 The decisions did not set forth clear and workable rules for
lower courts to apply to similar cases. As lower court judges attempted
to make sense of the law, defendants pointed them toward Chicago,
where a coherent approach to the law was taking shape.
Any judges tempted by the Chicago School of thought still needed
some authority to make the leap from the proposition that economic
analysis could provide a workable approach to antitrust to the proposi-
tion that courts should rely on economic analysis to interpret the law.
Robert Bork supplied the bridge to move from the positive to the nor-
mative. In 1966, Bork published an article intended to justify consumer
welfare as the sole goal of antitrust on the basis of the legislative history
of the Sherman Act. 6 Bork continued to push his case in his influential
book, The Antitrust Paradox.7
By the time Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the Supreme
Court's antitrust jurisprudence of the 1960s was widely considered to be
intellectually bankrupt. 8 Bork had supplied a basis for arguing that
Congress had always intended that antitrust law be interpreted in a way
akin to the Chicago approach. In Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc.,19 a 1977 decision, the Supreme Court began to move toward an
approach that explicitly relied upon economic analysis.
In the 1960s, when most of the important antitrust cases were still government cases
and the typical private plaintiff was (or at least was believed to be) a "free rider" on
some earlier government suit, the Supreme Court-in part I believe in order to lighten
its own antitrust docket-wrote the enforcement agencies virtually a blank check, per-
haps trusting to the continued exercise by the agencies of a sober self-restraint in filling
in the blanks.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTRrus-r LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 229 (1976) (footnotes
omitted).
15. Von's Grocery was the occasion for dissenting Justice Stewart's well-known observa-
tion: "The sole consistency I can find is that in litigation under § 7 [of the Clayton Act] the
Government always wins." Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
16. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966).
17. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 13.
18. President Reagan's first Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, William F. Baxter, was characteristically blunt in his assessment of the earlier state of the
law: "There simply is no respectable intellectual support, at least among academic econo-
mists, for the outmoded, amateur jerry-built, pseudo-economic propositions that underlay so
much of antitrust during the sixties and on into the early seventies." Interview with William .
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General; Antitrust Division, 52 ANTrrRusTr LJ. 23, 42 (1983).
19. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
1994]
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President Reagan added momentum to this trend by plucking from
academia many of the most articulate spokesmen for the Chicago School
approach and installing them on the courts of appeals. The new judges,
including Bork on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit, began to
write opinions reflecting the Chicago approach, including the view that
consumer welfare should be the exclusive focus of the law.
20
These decisions provided authority for subsequent decisions along
the same lines. Today, one seeking to persuade a court to adopt an eco-
nomic approach to an antitrust issue need not rely on only law review
articles, such as Bork's 1966 article, but instead can string together ex-
tensive citations to recent case law to support the proposition that Aaron
Director had the right idea all along.
b) The Profit-Maximization Hypothesis
The Chicago School approach relies on the profit-maximization hy-
pothesis for the tools of analysis necessary to further the consumer wel-
fare goal. According to this hypothesis, all human interactions can be
analyzed as voluntary and discrete market transactions. Because they
are voluntary, all transactions must make both parties better off; other-
wise, they would not take place. This means that transactions can be
usefully analyzed by asking what each participant gets out of the ex-
change. The discrete nature of the transaction means the analyst need
look no further than the actual exchange. Analysts can thus interpret
observed market behavior by searching for explanations of the economic
logic behind the activities.
In its purest form, articulated most forcefully by Robert Bork, the
profit-maximization approach is simplicity itself when applied to busi-
ness activities at issue in antitrust disputes. All business activities are
designed to maximize profits. There are only two possible avenues for
firms seeking to increase their profits. The first is to operate more effi-
ciently and thereby capture more profits from sales at the competitive
20. E.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
934 (1987); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Bork, J.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc.,
737 F.2d 698, 707 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Valley Liquors, Inc.
v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
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price. The second is to exercise monopoly power, which will restrict out-
put and raise prices above the competitive level, and thereby decrease
sales and increase profits. All business strategies must be intended as
steps toward greater efficiency or steps toward monopoly.21
Seeking higher profits by restricting output is generally impractical.
Assuming that barriers to entry in the relevant market are low (and bar-
riers are nearly always low in the absence of government interference2 2),
monopoly power is virtually impossible to achieve or maintain for any
significant length of time. Any effort to restrict output by one firm will
be met with expanded output by other firms. In the vast majority of
cases, unhindered market forces are an effective check against the devel-
opment of monopoly power.'
Because nearly all firms know that they cannot succeed in achieving
or exercising monopoly power, they do not try. Therefore, their strate-
gies must be to increase their efficiency. Since efficiency is the single
goal of the antitrust laws, such strategies cannot amount to violations.
The profit-maximization hypothesis provides the means for reasoning
that most actions challenged under the antitrust laws do not seriously
threaten consumer welfare.
2. The Logic of the Chicago School Approach
a) The Problems
There are serious problems with both components of the Chicago
School method of analysis. First, it is difficult to understand why con-
sumer welfare should be accepted as the exclusive goal of antitrust law.
Indeed, it is counterintuitive to believe that Congress adopted a statute
based entirely on an abstraction like consumer welfare. What sort of
political forces could possibly provide the impetus for this exercise in
applied economic theory?
Moreover, the Chicago School approach is based on an economic hy-
pothesis whose advancement began years after the passage of the Sher-
man Act in 1890.24 To assume that Congress was driven by abstract
21. Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 221 (Bork, J.) ("If it is clear that [the defend-
ant] and its agents ... are not attempting to restrict industry output, then their agreement
must be designed to make the conduct of their business more effective. No third possibility
suggests itself.").
22. Posner, supra note 13, at 946-47.
23. Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 20.
24. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Commentary: Antitrust 1889, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 150, 151
(1990); George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. EcoN. REv.
1, 3 (1982).
1994]
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academic theories is difficult, but to suggest that Senators and Repre-
sentatives were somehow psychic in anticipating the hypotheses and for-
mulas that would later develop is absurd.
In his 1978 book, Bork argues that "[t]he legislative history of the
Sherman Act, the oldest and most basic of the antitrust statutes, displays
the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer wel-
fare."25 The sense of certitude suggests that Bork's assertion is firmly
grounded in fact. However, subsequent scholarship has clearly demon-
strated that Bork's work is not a respectable piece of historical
research.26
A serious problem with the profit-maximization hypothesis is that it
does not work very well. While the hypothesis may illuminate general
trends over time, it is not useful in explaining the particular actions at
issue in antitrust or any other litigation. The world we actually inhabit
includes mistakes, imperfect information, and asymmetries between the
goals of a firm and the goals of individual decision-makers within that
firm. There is simply no reason to assume that antitrust defendants ra-
tionally and correctly selected the particular actions under judicial scru-
tiny as profit-maximizing responses to market conditions.
This point has won recognition as litigants have attempted to rely
upon the assumption for purposes other than arguing why an antitrust
case should be dismissed. For example, in AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illi-
nois Tool Works, Inc.,27 the defendant, appealing a finding of fraud, ar-
gued that the plaintiff's theory assumed that the defendant had acted
irrationally. Writing for the court, Judge Posner did not think that this
was reason to discount the theory:
[I]t is not a defense to fraud that the defendant erred in thinking
fraud the profit-maximizing response to the problem in which it
found itself. Litigation arises from the pathology of social inter-
actions, so we should not be surprised that often parties to litiga-
tion appear to have acted from incomprehensible motives,
25. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 13, at 61 (citing Bork, supra note 16).
26. E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition,
74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1989); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67,
68 (1982); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Con-
stitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 257, 259 (1989); David Millon,
The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1223 (1988); Rudolph J.
Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 285, 287 (1989); F.M. Scherer, Efficiency, Fairness, and the Early Contributions of
Economists to the Antitrust Debate, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 243, 247 (1990).
27. 896 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1990).
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behaved irrationally, misconceived their self-interest, exhibited
bizarre deviations from rationality.2 8
Although courts are willing to recognize "bizarre deviations from ra-
tionality" in other contexts, the profit-maximization hypothesis allows
for no such exceptions. Its assumption that firms always act rationally to
maximize their profits leads to unfortunate consequences. Courts almost
invariably tolerate a firm inflicting harm on its competitors on the as-
sumption that the injuries suffered are the unfortunate but necessary by-
products of the march toward a more efficient economy. In fact, there
may have been nothing efficient about the actions; the litigation may
have arisen from "the pathology of social interactions," and the firm do-
ing the damage may simply have wanted to cripple its rivals.
b) The Responses
Advocates of the Chicago School approach have responded to the
foregoing criticisms of their two basic premises. Both responses entail a
two-step argument. One of the steps of each argument relies upon an
attribute of the premise that is not under attack as a way of justifying the
premise that is under attack.
(i) The Consumer Welfare Goal
Today, not even the Chicagoans appear willing to defend the histori-
cal scholarship of Robert Bork. Instead, the first step in the Chicagoans'
defense of an exclusive focus on consumer welfare is a declaration of
agnosticism as to the actual legislative intent of the Sherman Act. Judge
Posner's discussion of legislative intent is typical:
I don't think the Senators and Congressmen who voted for the
Sherman Act had any clear idea of what it was to do. They were
worried about trusts, but behind that almost meaningless general-
ity, different members of Congress had different concerns. Some
were concerned because trusts were hurting consumers, and some
were concerned because they were hurting other sellers. So it is a
confused picture. It seems to me that courts have to make sense
out of the statute pretty much on their own, without the benefit of
legislative history. 9
28. Id. at 1043.
29. From Von's to Schwinn to the Chicago School Interview with Judge Richard Posner,
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, ANTrrRusT, Spring 1992, at 4, 4. This view reflects a bit of
back-pedaling on the part of Judge Posner. In 1976, Posner cited to Bork's article as support
for the proposition that the "framers of the Sherman Act appear to have been concerned
1994]
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Once legislative intent has been dismissed as a source of interpreta-
tive guidance, the Chicago School advocates proceed to the second step
of the argument. They attempt to justify the consumer welfare goal on
the basis of the profit-maximization hypothesis. The approach is to be
endorsed because, thanks to the hypothesis, it leads to clear and worka-
ble rules to resolve nearly all antitrust issues. The implications of the
profit-maximization hypothesis are all that a judge needs to resolve any
antitrust dispute. The attraction of the approach is magnified when it is
stacked up against other approaches that lack a tool as simple yet power-
ful as the profit maximization hypothesis. In comparison, other concepts
of the law appear result oriented and unable to generate objective and
workable rules.
Easterbrook has neatly summarized the two-step justification for an
exclusive consumer welfare goal: "I agree with Robert Bork that,
whatever one makes of [the legislative] history, the antitrust laws should
be treated as if they served no goal other than economic efficiency....
Any other approach renders the statutes incomprehensible."3
(ii) The Profit-Maximization Hypothesis
The problem with the profit-maximization hypothesis is that it does
not work very well when applied to the particular actions at issue in anti-
trust litigation. The first of the two steps in the Chicagoans' response
invokes the consumer welfare goal.
Because the sole purpose of the law is assumed to be the efficient
ordering of the market, the claims of firms injured by allegedly anticom-
petitive acts are only entitled to consideration to the extent that the acts
inflicting the injury are also inefficient. "The antitrust laws are designed
to maximize welfare by protecting competition, not competitors. A
practice that injures competitors is thus of no antitrust concern unless it
also reduces consumers' welfare." 3 1
Thus, the direct victims of the actions challenged in antitrust litiga-
tion have no inherent call on the law's protections. As Judge Easter-
brook has written, "Antitrust law condemns results harmful to
consumers; it condemns bad means to the extent they have a tendency to
mainly with the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels." POSNER, supra
note 14, at 23.
30. Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHi. L. REv.
263, 266 n.11 (1981) [hereinafter Predatory Strategies].
31. Id. at 266 (footnote omitted).
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bad results. . . . Acts that do not harm consumers need not be
justified."32
Once this first step is accepted and qualms about the plight of those
seeking the law's protection are shunted aside as beyond the proper con-
cern of antitrust, then the unreliability of the profit-maximization hy-
pothesis can be addressed in a straightforward manner. The issue
becomes one of comparative advantage. No rule is perfect. Is it better
to rely on the profit-maximization hypothesis, knowing that there will be
some false negative errors whereby courts fail to condemn truly anticom-
petitive behavior? Or is it better for courts to apply a stricter rule that
will result in some false positive errors whereby courts condemn behav-
ior that is actually efficient and procompetitive?
For reasons explained by Easterbrook, the choice is an easy one for
Chicago School advocates:
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits
may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned
practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the
benefits. If the court errs by permitting a deleterious 'practice,
though, the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is self-
destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.33
In one of his first antitrust decisions, Judge Posner made a similar
point in explaining why courts should demand a showing of market
power before condemning a vertical restraint:
A firm that has no market power is unlikely to adopt policies that
disserve its consumers; it cannot afford to. And if it blunders and
does adopt such a policy, market retribution will be swift. Thus
its mistakes do not seriously threaten consumer welfare, which is
the objective that we are told should guide us in interpreting the
Sherman Act.34
The consumer welfare goal teaches us that the sole concern of anti-
trust law is with actions designed to restrict output and raise prices.
Given the effectiveness of market forces in countering and frustrating
such strategies, little justification usually exists for, in Judge Posner's
words, "trundling out the great machinery of antitrust enforcement. '35
32. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 564 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); see also Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d
380, 394 (7th Cir. 1984); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 1984).
33. Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 2; see also Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership
v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 676 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992); THE
ANTrrRUST PARADOX, supra note 13, at 133.
34. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
35. 1&
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*As Easterbrook adds, "Anticompetitive business practices customarily
predecease the litigation they spawn."36
To Chicagoans, the false negatives generated by the profit maximiza-
tion hypothesis are thus preferable to false positives generated by other
ways of determining liability. Accordingly, the unreliability of the hy-
pothesis is not enough to disqualify the Chicago School approach.
c) The Problems Remain
The self-referential justifications that the consumer welfare goal and
the profit-maximization hypothesis offer each other create a M6bius
strip of rationalization. But once the goal and the tool of the Chicago
approach are each assessed on their own merits-free of the support the
other provides-the foundations of the Chicago approach reveal serious
fissures.
(i) The Consumer Welfare Goal
If consumer welfare has no historical legitimacy as the exclusive goal
of antitrust law, it cannot be justified by the easy application of the
profit-maximization hypothesis that it generates. Cut loose from any re-
lationship to the purpose of the law, an interpretive principle's ease of
application is not a compelling virtue. A rule that victory in antitrust
litigation goes to the party who is taller or whose last name contains the
most letters would be even easier to apply. But no one would recom-
mend either of these rules of decision; their application would be arbi-
trary and do nothing to advance the purposes of the law. Likewise, the
rules for decision derived from the profit-maximization hypothesis can-
not by themselves justify the consumer welfare goal. If there is a dis-
cernible purpose behind the law aside from consumer welfare, courts are
not entitled to ignore it in order to make their jobs easier.
(ii) The Profit-Maximization Hypothesis
The profit-maximization hypothesis is unreliable when applied to the
particular actions at issue in antitrust litigation. This shortcoming cannot
be excused by reference to the constricted sense of the purpose of the
law that an exclusive focus on consumer welfare prompts. If antitrust
plaintiffs injured by truly anticompetitive actions lose their lawsuits be-
cause the profit-maximization hypothesis is too blunt an instrument to
permit a court to appreciate the merits of their claims, it is not a satisfac-
36. Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 33.
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tory response to assert that the victims of anticompetitive actions have
no inherent call on the law's protections.
Further, the unreliability of the hypothesis cannot be justified by the
comparative advantage defense because this proves too much. The ap-
proach certainly implies that the entire third sphere of antitrust may be
discarded. But it goes further than this. If the premise is followed,
utilizing the Chicago assumptions, then the conclusion may be reached
that the law should never be invoked.
As it is, Judge Easterbrook has argued that only unadorned price-
fixing agreements among firms that together possess market power are
worth prohibiting.37 But even here, the case for prohibition is suspect.
A price-fixing agreement will lead to higher prices, which will make new
entry into the market attractive. If entry is easy, then the premises of the
Chicago approach lead to the conclusion that any inefficient attempt to
raise prices through collusion will fail and therefore will not be
attempted.38
Chicagoans do not typically assume free and instantaneous entry into
markets.39 Nonetheless, firms contemplating a price-fixing agreement
will have to consider the cost of attracting new entry. Even if entry is
not easy, a firm may be induced to incur the expense of coming into the
market as a result of customers in the market agreeing to long-term con-
tracts with the entrant.4" This would lead to a significant loss of demand
for the products of the colluding firms, a potential cost that, according to
Chicagoans, the colluding firms would take into account in determining
whether collusion would be profitable in the first place.
In addition, the issue is not simply whether the Sherman Act deters
harmful price-fixing agreements; it is whether the benefits of deterrence
are worth the costs of maintaining enforcement agencies and entertain-
ing long-lasting and expensive lawsuits. It is not at all clear that any
"core" of antitrust will remain after the Chicago approach is done with
it.
The profit-maximization hypothesis is a more powerful tool than
even the Chicagoans desire. In the absence of some countervailing prin-
ciple that restricts its application to those situations where it is most ap-
propriate, profit maximization consumes rather than focuses the law.
37. Id. at 39.
38. This shortcoming of the Chicago approach is developed in Donald Dewey, Informa-
tion, Entry, and Welfare: The Case for Collusion, 69 AM. ECON. Rnv. 587 (1979).
39. See Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 33.
40. See Predatory Strategies, supra note 30, at 270-71.
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This casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of the Chicago approach be-
cause it is difficult to argue that Congress meant to enact a statute based
upon an explanatory principle that when rigorously applied leads to the
conclusion that the statute can never be violated.
B. The Chicago School Approach as Social Policy
The economic approach teaches the importance of considering the
unintended consequences of public policies-effects that ripple across
society in ways that were neither anticipated nor desired. The Chicago
School approach to antitrust has a number of implications that are un-
fortunate in light of the system of beliefs and values that underpins the
structure of our social institutions.
1. A Theory That Runs Like Clockwork
The Chicago School approach is based on a sense of determinism
that is inconsistent with the beliefs in free will and individual responsibil-
ity that animate our system of government. This sense of determinism is
a consequence of economists' fervent belief that economics is more like
physics than sociology.41 As Robert Bork noted, "Basic microeconomic
theory is of course a science, though like many other sciences it is by no
means complete in all its branches. Were it not a science, rational anti-
trust policy would be impossible."42
Different methods of sorting out existence lay claim to scientific sta-
tus to the extent that they possess predictive power. A scientific ap-
proach assumes that if one understands the various forces at work at a
specific point, one can predict the result of their interaction. If two at-
oms of hydrogen meet up with one atom of oxygen under specified con-
ditions, they are always going to combine into one molecule of water. If
they do not, and if their response is random in some significant sense,
then chemistry would be a drama rather than a science.
If economics is a science, then economic behavior must be predict-
able. All individuals, whatever their background or idiosyncracies, must
respond in the same way to the same economic stimuli. If we know the
factors that they must take into account, then we will be able to predict
their actions with certainty. The world of the Chicagoans is entirely
deterministic.
41. Whitney Cunningham, Note, Testing Posner's Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization,
81 GEo. L.J. 141, 158 (1992).
42. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 13, at 8.
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In a deterministic world, procedural concepts such as fairness hold no
meaning. The very idea of fairness assumes an indeterminacy of out-
comes that is fundamentally inconsistent with the economic approach.
When the result is preordained, there is no reason to be concerned about
the process, just as it makes no sense to give freon a "fair chance" to
freeze at the same temperature as water.
Those under the sway of the economic approach have considerable
difficulty even grasping the notion of fairness. For example, Judge Eas-
terbrook's writings show that he is not quite sure what fairness means,
but he knows he does not like it. Easterbrook implicitly admits that he
does not inderstand the term to have meaning by invariably including it
within quotation marks, the grammatical equivalent of holding the word
as far from the body as possible, as if it were some sort of roadkill: "[Oli-
ver] Williamson argues that rules against predation should assure 'fair-
ness.' . . . This assumes that some amount of efficiency should be
sacrificed to 'fairness' but does not specify how the trade is to be made,
or why the antitrust laws are appropriate instruments for making such
decisions." 43
When pushed for a definition, Judge Easterbrook appears to believe
"fairness" is simply another word for not trying hard:
My brethren want rivalry to be "fair." ... Who says that com-
petition is supposed to be fair, that we judge the behavior of the
marketplace by the ethics of the courtroom?
... When economic pressure must give way to fair conduct, as
the court today holds it must, rivals will trim their sails. Fair com-
petition is tempered competition. 44
Similarly, George Stigler has suggested that terms like "justice" and
"fairness" are just weasel words that can mean anything anyone wants.
To him, the lawyer's concept of fairness is "a suitcase full of bottled eth-
ics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of justice."45
The problem with endorsing this "scientific" and deterministic ap-
proach as a foundation for the formation of public policy is not just that
43. Predatory Strategies, supra note 30, at 266 n.12 (citations omitted).
44. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
45. George J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1972); see also 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 21 (1978) ("As a goal of antitrust policy, 'fairness' is a vagrant claim applied to any value
that one happens to favor.").
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it renders the concept of fairness incomprehensible. It is also irreconcil-
able With the animating ideas of our system of government.
One can argue on a philosophical level about whether we truly exer-
cise free will in a meaningful sense and whether the concept is a useful
one for the purpose of constructing theories of behavior.46 But the issue
is foreclosed as far as public policy is concerned. We have based our
system of government on the idea that each individual is entitled to dig-
nity, autonomy, and formal equality because each of us is capable of
exercising free choice. Consequently, each of us is responsible for the
choices that we make.
It is as incongruous to overlay upon this system an approach to an
area of law based on determinism as it would be to attempt to incorpo-
rate into Newtonian physics a theory based on the premise that objects
decide for themselves how fast they will fall to earth. The jarring incom-
patibility of the premises of the Chicago School with those generally un-
derlying our political system seriously compromises any claim of
historical or political legitimacy of the approach.
2. Endangering Entrepreneurs
The absence of concern for the direct victims of allegedly anticompe-
titive actions is a distinguishing feature of the economic approach. It is
also bad economic policy. Our system depends upon the infusion of new
ideas, capital, and energy that entrepreneurs bring to their fledgling ven-
tures: Schumpeter's continuous gale of creative destruction.47 As a gen-
eral matter, those entrepreneurs respond to signals and incentives, as
economics teaches. One of the more powerful signals our system can
send is that success is possible for anyone, that success or failure will be
determined by the impersonal forces of the market, rather than by the
desires or whims of the more powerful. This message is an energizing
one:
America is strongest when it is most open and optimistic. This
sounds like a platitude, but it has important practical effects.
When ordinary people believe they have a fair chance, they usu-
ally do their best, and the whole country benefits from their ef-
forts. The interests of individual Americans are well matched to
46. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 171-90 (1990) (discuss-
ing the utility of a concept of free will in jurisprudence).
47. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (George, Al-
len & Unwin Ltd. 1976) (1942).
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the society's collective good. But if Americans think they are
trapped, cheated, stuck, or doomed, most of them do not try.4'
The message that the avenues of opportunity are open implicitly
promises that competition will be fair and that the results of competition
will be respected. Fairness is a procedural concept. It consists of guaran-
teeing an equal opportunity to all those who seek to participate in a par-
ticular undertaking. Our political system places a high value on
procedural fairness because our beliefs in free will and responsibility as-
sign a distinct value to achievement. Furthermore, our faith in the varia-
bility of human outcomes means that we will be unable to predict
achievement before it manifests itself as a result of a fair competitive
process.
Competition under conditions of fairness is a ratifying process. The
competitors who achieve success thereby prove that they deserve it. It
follows that winners should be entitled to enjoy the fruits of their suc-
cess. The prospect of enjoying the earned and deserved rewards of suc-
cess helps drive our system by supplying powerful incentives for
entrepreneurs and thereby generating a constant infusion of new energy
and ideas.
The economic approach to antitrust tosses all of this overboard. Be-
cause the approach assumes that results are preordained, it perceives no
reason to be concerned about the fairness or legitimacy of the competi-
tive process. What is worse, the absurdly tolerant concept of efficiency
that the approach champions generally results in the ratification of acts
of depredation by powerful businesses against new and far more vulner-
able competitors.
This policy is destructive because it increases the risk of en-
trepreneurial activity. Once the law abandons its role of protecting the
fairness and legitimacy of the competitive process, that process becomes
more prone to random acts of anticompetitive violence. Such a policy
discourages the entrepreneurial activity necessary to stoke the furnaces
of the economy.
3. Jury Avoidance
The Chicago School approach also leads to increased reliance on
summary judgment and other ways of resolving lawsuits by judges rather
than juries. This antidemocratic tendency squanders the beneficial at-
tributes of our jury system.
48. JAMEs FALLOWS, MORE LIKE Us: MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN 185 (1989).
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For many years, briefs of antitrust plaintiffs opposing motions for
summary judgment contained ritual invocations of Poller v. CBS.4 9 In
Poller, the Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment to de-
fendants in an antitrust case. The plaintiff built its case upon a far-
fetched theory that CBS had joined in a conspiracy to destroy the value
of a UHF television station in Milwaukee. In language that many anti-
trust attorneys could recite by heart, the Court explained:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,
and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the wit-
nesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be ap-
praised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which
so long has been the hallmark of "even handed justice."50
In the thirty years since Poller, judicial attitudes toward summary
judgment in antitrust cases have taken a 180-degree turn. Today, cases
are routinely dismissed before trial.5 Reflecting the change that was
apparent by 1987, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
"summary judgment should be a favored practice in antitrust cases."' 52
Former Federal Trade Commissioner Terry Calvani describes the move-
ment away from Poller as "a phenomenal change. ' 53 According to
Calvani, "for 'real world' lawyers with 'real world' clients, the demise of
the Poller Doctrine may be the single most important antitrust develop-
ment in twenty years."54
This dramatic reversal in approach has been driven by courts' in-
creasing acceptance of Chicago theories. The seminal case in the area is
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.55 The plaintiffs
49. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
50. Id. at 473 (footnote omitted).
51. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1129 (1986). The article is
an outgrowth of the Georgetown study of private treble damage litigation. According to Rob-
ert Pitofsky, "The most striking finding of the Georgetown study is that judges are today
granting summary judgment and motions to dismiss far more frequently than in recent years."
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 833 (1987).
52. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 660 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
53. Terry Calvani, Future Direction of Antitrust Law Enforcement, 29 WASHBURN LJ.
364, 365 (1990).
54. Id.
55. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Matsushita extended an approach evident in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593-95.
[Vol. 77:265
FAIRNESS IN ANTITRUST
alleged that a number of Japanese manufacturers had conspired to drive
American firms from the market for television sets in the United States
by charging predatorily low prices. The Court relied on Chicago scholar-
ship for the proposition that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful."56
Sympathetic to the Chicago premise that firms do not often behave
contrary to the teachings of economic theory, the Court announced a
challenging evidentiary standard: "[I]f the factual context renders
[plaintiffs'] claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no
economic sense-[plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary. 57
Matsushita established an attitude more than a workable rule. The
Court did not explain how lower courts should determine whether a
plaintiff's evidence is sufficiently "more persuasive" to survive a sum-
mary judgment motion. Nevertheless, lower courts have recognized and
put to their own uses the tone of hostility to antitrust claims that perme-
ates the Supreme Court decision.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.58 represents a step in the other direction. There,
the Court cautioned that no different standards for summary judgment
are applicable in the antitrust field and that lower courts should not be
quite so eager to dismiss antitrust claims. Kodak is significant because it
runs counter to a strong and rising tide in favor of minimizing the role of
juries in antitrust cases. Indeed, Donald Turner, formerly in charge of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and a respected
scholar, has recommended that in antitrust cases jury trials be abolished
all together.59
Trial by jury plays a key role in our system of justice. From the per-
spective of the juror, jury service represents, next to voting, the individ-
ual's most direct participation in our process of governance. The jury
system reinforces notions of social equality in a very effective way.
Every juror's vote counts and every vote counts the same.
The jury system also fosters our belief in a common set of values and
moral principles. Verdicts are reached not on the basis of academic the-
orizing but as a result of a group of people sitting around a table and
56. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
57. Id. at 587.
58. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
59. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy,
75 CAL L. REv. 797, 812-14 (1987).
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hashing out individual differences until a consensus is reached. This
model of decision-making recognizes that we do share common values
and can undertake a meaningful dialogue with others from different
walks of life and different life experiences.
From the perspective of the litigants, the jury system is an effective
ameliorative institution. Those involved in lawsuits tend to believe that
their disputes are important enough to command serious social atten-
tion. The witnesses will testify, the parties will have a chance to tell their
stories, and a jury drawn from the community will undertake the solemn
task of reaching a verdict. The trial process frequently entails a benefi-
cial purgative effect for the litigants, who seek the assurance that their
concerns are treated seriously and considered fairly, wholly apart from
their desire for the outcome they seek.6"
There is value in the process both for the jurors and the litigants,
which helps make the jury system a critical institution for fostering civic
virtue. The distrust of this system evident in the economic approach to
antitrust and the movement toward a system more akin to administrative
law for resolving these claims is antidemocratic, reflecting a distrust of
both the citizens sitting on juries and of the informal, consensus-building
model of decision-making that the jury system embodies.
4. Speaking in Tongues
Another limitation of the economic approach is that it is premised
upon the futility of a meaningful dialogue on values and denies the
moral dimension our laws can embody. The economic approach pro-
ceeds from the premise that the explosion in diversity that can be a
source of our national strength has also resulted in a babel of conflicting
and confusing moral dialects precluding the achievement of a moral
consensus.
Rejecting the possibility of social agreement on values, the economic
approach retreats to a logic of locating value solely in individual con-
sumption choices. To the economist, an object has value only to the ex-
tent that a particular individual is willing and able to acquire it.
Whatever commands the highest price automatically possesses the great-
est value. Consistent with this view, the purpose of the law is to maxi-
mize value in the sense of preserving a system whereby goods gravitate
to their highest valued uses.
60. Posner has recognized this point. POSNER, supra note 46, at 206.
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The economic approach can lead to results that many of us find mor-
ally repugnant. For example, Chicagoans tolerate, indeed applaud, an
efficient firm using any means at its disposal to drive a less efficient firm
out of business. As Judge Easterbrook has written, "If there will be but
one survivor, the better to be quick about getting there."'" Within cer-
tain constraints, those subscribing to the economic approach to antitrust
are willing to equate the law of the market with the law of the jungle.
Most of us have higher expectations than that for the standards of
conduct demanded by our laws. However, when decision-making is
based exclusively on economic principles and thus handed over to the
priesthood of economists, opposition to an antitrust rule based on non-
economic values simply does not register. It is like objecting to the an-
swer to a geometry problem on moral grounds.
There is no reason to embrace policy that may lead to results that
most people find distasteful. The law would be improved if it contained
a workable method of addressing the dissonance that results when rules
of law are inconsistent with widely shared concepts of right and wrong.
The balance of this Article explains how this might be accomplished.
III. RECLAIMING THE SOUL OF ANTITRUST
A. Introduction
It is not enough to point out flaws in the Chicago School approach.
To have practical value, a critique must be coupled with an alternative
approach that is more faithful to our values and institutions as well as
more appropriate to all three spheres of antitrust. The alternative must
entail more than lofty rhetoric about other values and goals, with the
details left for later. Identified goals must translate into- workable
rules-rules that are specific, sensible, consistent, comprehensive, and
applicable by busy judges trying to manage overloaded dockets. It is not
sufficient to tell the courts to take all relevant factors into account and
then to walk away with a sense of relief over having solved that problem.
Proposed rules for resolving legal disputes should be formulated with
one eye on the practical limitations of the litigation process. The Chi-
cago School approach is successful in large part because it is based on
economic principles that are simple enough to be manageable.
Some commentators criticize the Chicago approach because its theo-
retical apparatus is underdeveloped. These critics believe that the law
61. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 573 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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needs more economics, not less. Accordingly, different approaches to
antitrust problems are proposed that incorporate more sophisticated and
complex theories. Such proposals may be useful if they are offered to
justify per se rules of legality or illegality. However, to the extent that
the proposals suggest that legality should turn on a number of identified
economic factors, they are likely to be a waste of time. It does not mat-
ter how much more accurate such proposed rules are in a theoretical
sense. They quickly move the laws to a plane of abstraction beyond the
interests of busy judges. As an institutional matter, courts have a low
tolerance for complexity in the legal rules they must apply.62
Once the shortcomings of the economic approach are recognized, the
next step in revitalizing antitrust is identifying a goal that has sufficient
historical legitimacy and content to be capable of counterbalancing eco-
nomic efficiency. To explain why competitive fairness should be the
goal, the next section of this Article reviews the political history of anti-
trust from the Civil War to World War I. The following section attempts
to develop the concept of competitive fairness in a way that leads to
workable rules that accommodate fairness and efficiency.
B. The Role of Fairness in the Politics of Antitrust
The nature of business competition became a significant political is-
sue during the latter half of the nineteenth century because there sud-
denly was so much of it. A convergence of technological developments,
including expansion of the railroads and dramatic improvements in com-
munications capabilities, fueled the rapid growth of markets. The har-
nessing of electrical power and development of larger and more
specialized machinery, operated by workers from the plentiful labor
pools in the growing urban centers, enabled firms to meet the needs of
62. Perhaps the best example of how academic theorizing can quickly become irrelevant
to practical decision-making is the dispute about the appropriate test for identifying predatory
pricing. See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Prac-
tices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975); F.M. Scherer, Preda-
tory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1976); Oliver E.
Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
Many scholars recommended tests for predatory pricing based on comparisons of prices to
particular measures of costs. Regardless of their logic, these tests require plaintiffs to analyze
defendants' prices and costs in ways that are nearly always beyond the capacities of the litiga-
tion process. Courts would have a very difficult time utilizing any price-cost test in a meaning-
ful way. On the other hand, the Chicago School view is that, by and large, predatory pricing is
simply not worth worrying about. See Predatory Strategies, supra note 30, at 264. This is the
type of clear-cut conclusion that judges can put to use, as Judge Easterbrook has. E.g., A.A.
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-04 (7th Cir. 1989).
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newly expanding markets. The result was business on a new scale and
emerging competition that sometimes grew bareknuckled and raw.
Firms that failed to adjust fell by the wayside while more adaptable en-
terprises grew at dizzying rates.
Many believed that unbuttoned rivalry led to overproduction and
outbreaks of ruinously low prices. Cooperation often appeared a more
reasonable and less destructive strategy.63 Consequently, in the decade
after the Civil War, competitors commonly entered into loose agree-
ments to set prices. Because the temptation to cheat on such agreements
proved irresistible to many, forms of combination grew increasingly for-
mal and sophisticated. This process culminated in the creation of the
Standard Oil trust in 1879. The forty-one investors in forty corporations
that eventually formed the Standard Oil trust surrendered their stock to
the organizers of the enterprise, led by John D. Rockefeller, and re-
ceived trust certificates and healthy dividends in return.64 The Standard
Oil trust form worked well and proved popular with corporate lawyers.
As a result, many similar trusts were created to control the production
and sale of dozens of commodities.65
In a happy coincidence for the new trust barons, a social theory de-
veloped about this time holding that everyone able to earn a vast fortune
at business endeavors deserved every cent they made and contributed
far more to society by their efforts than they would ever be able to take
out in wages and dividends. The doctrine was adapted from the theory
of biological evolution developed in On the Origin of Species,66 first pub-
lished in 1857, and came to be known as Social Darwinism.
Herbert Spencer popularized Social Darwinism in the United States.
In Social Statics,67 first available in America in the 1860s, Spencer argued
that society, driven by the pressure of subsistence, made slow, painful,
and evolutionary progress as the result of the struggle that led to the
survival of the fittest. This was not a cheery philosophy for those who
lacked the gifts to prosper in society: "If they are sufficiently complete
63. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr 73-74 (1965).
64. BRUCE BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE STANDARD OIL
CASES, 1890-1911, at 12 (1979); HANS B. THoRELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIG-
INATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 76-78 (1954).
65. WILLIAM W. COOK, "TRUSTS": THE RECENT COMBINATIONS IN TRADE 51 (2d ed.
New York, L.K. Strause & Co. 1888).
66. CHARLES R. DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1857).
67. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1878).
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to live, they do live, and it is well they should live. If they are not suffi-
ciently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die."68
Spencer and others applied the same bleak analysis to the world of
business. The competitive struggle had prompted the development of
newer, larger, more complex and sophisticated forms of enterprise. The
trusts, as the latest products of the evolutionary process, would inevita-
bly prevail over their smaller, outmoded rivals, who would lumber off in
the way of the brontosaurus.
The bleakness for the victims was matched by a sense of satisfaction
for the victors. Those who ran the trusts would deserve their enormous
fortunes. Their success would certify that they were the fittest of their
breed, and their efforts would carry forward the progress that advanced
the race.69
Social Darwinist views represented a fundamental challenge to tradi-
tional American beliefs in equality and opportunity. Success became a
consequence of inevitable development rather than individual initiative
or skill. Because the result was predestined, there could be little objec-
tion to the trusts using any means to overcome their more traditional
rivals and hasten the next stage of development.
The notion of fair competition lost its meaning. More traditional
businessmen, who saw themselves as the victims of the trusts, were trans-
formed from formally equal competitors with a realistic hope of success
to the obsolete detritus of an evolving society.
The result was a clash of beliefs, as citizens grappled with what Mar-
tin Sklar has described as the corporate reconstruction of American cap-
italism.7" The resulting social and political ferment inevitably washed
into the halls of Congress. There the pressure built until it was first re-
leased in the 1890 passage of the Sherman Act and twenty-four years
later in the passage of the Clayton Act and creation of the Federal Trade
Commission.
The traditional view prevailed. Both the Sherman Act and the legis-
lation of 1914 represent victories for those who saw business rivalry as an
unpredictable contest among formally equal competitors and defeat for
those who saw in the results of competition the inevitable outcome of an
68. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 41 (rev. ed.
1959) (quoting SPENCER, supra note 67, at 414-15).
69. This was the thrust of Andrew Carnegie's most famous essay, Wealth, 1889 N. AM.
REV. 42.
70. MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM,
1890-1916 (1988).
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evolutionary process. As a result, the antitrust laws define fair competi-
tion as the touchstone of legality and seek to preserve formal equality
among competitors as the means by which fair competition may be
preserved.
This purpose is apparent in the legislative history of the Sherman
Act. Senator John Sherman's major speech in support of the legislation
that came to bear his name, delivered on March 21, 1890, is generally
recognized as the single most fruitful source for deducing congressional
intent 7l Like any politician defending a novel proposal, Sherman
started out by reassuring his colleagues that the bill embraced no revolu-
tionary concepts. Next, in the most important language of the speech,
Sherman described the purpose of the legislation: "This bill, as I would
have it, has for its single object.., to supplement the enforcement of the
established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the
several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the in-
dustrial liberty of the citizens of these States. 72
Sherman's purpose was to hold trusts and combinations accountable
to a federal standard designed to safeguard the "industrial liberty" of
citizens. Sherman defined the term in a way that identified the bill's
limiting principle:
It is said that this bill will interfere with lawful trade, with the
customary business of life. I deny it. It aims only at unlawful
combinations. It does not in the least affect combinations in aid
of production where there is free and fair competition. It is the
right of every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful vo-
cation and to transport his production on equal terms and condi-
tions and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and
lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges.73
Thus, the limiting principle of the bill was the notion of "industrial
liberty." The concept encompassed the right of every individual to work
at any lawful vocation on equal terms with anyone else, large or small.
This is the type of structured competition that underlies the concept of
fairness. Congress intended trusts to be judged against this standard.
According to Sherman, the "single object" of the bill was to empower
the federal courts to protect the right of industrial liberty.74
71. See THORELLT, supra note 64, at 226; Bork, supra note 16, at 45; May, supra note 26, at
289.
72. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
73. Id.
74. Until recently, the Supreme Court had regularly recognized this concept, variously
described as the right of freedom to trade, competitive freedom, or economic liberty, as an
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Many studies of the legislative history of the antitrust laws begin and
end with the congressional deliberations on the Sherman Act. This nar-
row approach tends to neglect the broader political currents that pushed
the issue onto the legislative agenda as well as developments from 1888
to 1914 when antitrust was most prominent as a political issue.
For example, the presidential campaign of 1912 and the subsequent
antitrust legislation of 1914 illustrate how skillful evocation of its sym-
bolic value could cause antitrust to resonate as an issue. It also rein-
forces the competitive fairness strain of the law and the unreality of
attributing a concern for economic theory to the politicians responsible
for the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court's landmark 1911 decision in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States75 affirmed the lower court order splitting up the colossus.
However, the decision also imposed a "rule of reason" gloss on the
straightforward language of the Sherman Act. The rule of reason
seemed to equip the generally conservative judiciary with an effective
tool for ignoring the spirit of the statute. As a result, popular sentiment
grew in favor of additional legislation to strengthen the law and spell out
more precisely what practices were prohibited.
Sensing the vulnerability of incumbent William Howard Taft and
Progressive candidate Theodore Roosevelt on this issue,76 Woodrow
Wilson made attacks on the trusts one of the centerpieces of his cam-
paign. After his election, his speeches were gathered together in The
New Freedom.77 The book spells out the almost mystical belief in the
common people that shaped Wilson's approach:
important goal of the antitrust laws. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
610 (1972); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211, 213 (1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752 (1984); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 42 (1930); United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 376 (1923); Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill
Posters of the United States & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923); United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
75. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
76. Although Taft's Justice Department filed many significant antitrust cases, his view of
the law reflected an economic approach. See 1 WILLIAM H. TAFr, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
AND STATE PAPERS 54 (1910). Theodore Roosevelt had earned a reputation as a trustbuster.
However, reflecting Roosevelt's desire to retain the support of some well-heeled financiers
and businessmen, the Progressive Party adopted an antitrust plank that seemed to owe more
to Social Darwinism than to the notion of equality of opportunity. RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 231 (1948); ALPHEUS T.
MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 374-81 (1946).
77. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM (1913).
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The treasury of America does not lie in the brains of the small
body of men now in control of the great enterprises that have
been concentrated under the direction of a very small number of
persons. The treasury of America lies in those ambitions, those
energies, that cannot be restricted to a special favored class. It
depends upon the inventions of unknown men, upon the origina-
tions of unknown men, upon the ambitions of unknown men.
Every country is renewed out of the ranks of the unknown, not
out of the ranks of those already famous and powerful and in
control.78
According to Wilson, the genius of the American system was that it
was set up to recognize and profit from the contributions of the un-
known and the unheralded. It did this by fostering fair competition:
The reason that America was set up was that she might be differ-
ent from all the nations of the world in this: that the strong could
not put the weak to the wall, that the strong could not prevent the
weak from entering the race. America stands for opportunity.
America stands for a free field and no favor. America stands for
a government responsive to the interests of all.79
To Wilson, the American system of equal opportunity and fair com-
petition unleashed the nearly limitless potential of the common man.
This belief gave him a different perspective on the dangers that the trusts
created. When success is possible for everyone, everyone works harder
to succeed. Society prospers as the individual drive for advancement
powers the engines of progress. But to the extent that the trusts blocked
off the avenues of opportunity, the incentive for individual effort was
diminished and society stagnated:
Do you not see that just so soon as the old self-confidence of
America, just so soon as her old boasted advantage of individual
liberty and opportunity, is taken away, all the energy of her peo-
ple begins to subside, to slacken, to grow loose and pulpy, without
fibre, and men simply cast about to see that the day does not end
disastrously with them?80
From Wilson's perspective, America had a problem. The trusts were
squeezing out the small men on the make, the backbone of the country,
and if the trend continued, the American people would be transformed
from eager and ambitious workers into sullen drones, "pulpy" and
"without fibre."
78. Id. at 17-18.
79. d. at 221.
80. Id. at 291.
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Politicians are in the business of promising solutions, and Wilson had
one to offer. He described the "monopolistic methods" that he pro-
posed to prohibit:
[T]here must be no squeezing out of the beginner, no crippling
his credit; no discrimination against retailers who buy from a ri-
val; no threats against concerns who sell supplies to a rival; no
holding back of raw material from him; no secret arrangements
against him. All the fair competition you choose, but no unfair
competition of any kind.8
After winning passage of bills reducing the tariff and establishing the
federal reserve system, President Wilson delivered a special message on
trusts and monopolies before a joint session of Congress on January 20,
1914. Wilson's proposals and others were incorporated into four bills
introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Clayton,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. After much debate and amend-
ment, the various proposals became the Federal Trade Commission Act
and the Clayton Act of 1914.
Because the 1914 legislation was initiated by Wilson and closely
tracked his proposals, a natural conclusion is that the statutes were in-
tended to foster the same goal of competitive fairness that Wilson em-
braced in his campaign speeches. This conclusion is fortified by the
frequent declarations during congressional deliberations that the pur-
pose of antitrust law in general and the proposed legislation in particular
was to guarantee free and fair competition to business entities large and
small.82
Neither the supporters of the legislation nor virtually anyone else in
Congress approached the legislation from a perspective based on eco-
nomic theory. Indeed, it appears that only one member, Representative
Fess, claimed any knowledge of economic theory during the Clayton Act
deliberations. He stated: "As a student for some time of the subject of
concentration and control, as set forth by the investigations of Dr. Van
Hise, Bruce Wyman, and a great number of experts, such as Dr. Ripley,
Prof. Jenks, and Prof. Ely, I have well-defined convictions."83 His con-
victions led him to denounce the whole approach of the Clayton Act as
81. Id. at 173.
82. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 9155-56 (1914) (statement of Rep. Baily); id. at 9184 (state-
ment of Rep. Helvering); id. at 9196-97 (statement of Rep. Taggart); id. at 9273 (statement of
Rep. Carlin); id. at 9410 (statement of Rep. Mitchell); id. at 14,326 (statement of Sen.
Chilton); id. at 15,867 (statement of Sen. Reed); id. at 15,949 (statement of Sen. Borah); id. at
16,341 (statement of Sen. Gray).
83. Id. at 9697.
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unsound. He was one of fifty-four Representatives who voted against
passage of the original version of the bill.'
More typical was the rough-and-ready approach of Senator Reed,
who quoted with hearty approval "Champ" Clark's thoughts on a proper
antitrust enforcement policy: "If I had my way, I would fill the peniten-
tiaries and jails of the United States so full of trust magnates that their
arms and legs would stick out of the windows."85
In a speech before the American Electric Railway Association on
January 29, 1915, President Wilson offered a revealing description of the
purpose behind the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Wil-
son stated that it had been difficult to develop statutory definitions for
business competition, to remove the uncertainties, and to define what
was prohibited. He congratulated Congress for its efforts to do so in the
recent legislation and spoke in unmistakable metaphorical terms about
what Congress had accomplished:
Business does not want, and ought not to ask for, more liberty
than the individual has; and I have always in my own thought
summed up individual liberty, and business liberty, and every
other kind of liberty, in the phrase that is common in the sporting
world, "A free field and no favor."
I think it is a serviceable figure. It means this: That you are
not going to be barred from the contest because you are big and
strong, and you are not going to be penalized because you are big
and strong, but you are going to be made to observe the rules of
the track and not get in anybody's way except as you can keep
ahead of him by having more vigor and skill than he has.86
After passage of the Clayton Act, World War I captured the national
spotlight, and antitrust never again became as potent a political issue.
The two later substantive amendments to the antitrust laws-the Robin-
son-Patman Act of 193687 and the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to
section 7 of the Clayton ActS---were intended to tighten the laws and
represented no break from the legislative attitudes embodied in the
84. 1& at 9911.
85. Id at 15,862 (statement of Sen. Reed).
86. Woodrow Wilson, Address to the American Electric Railway Association (Jan. 29,
1915), in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 101, 101-02 (Albert Shaw ed.,
1924).
87. The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1988)).
88. Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184,64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1988)).
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Sherman and Clayton Acts. The meaning and purposes of the antitrust
laws are still to be found in the political history of the quarter-century
from 1888 to 1914 when antitrust ranked highest on the national agenda.
Deducing the spirit behind the antitrust movement of a century ago,
of course, does not necessarily tell us what the laws mean today. As the
careful legal scholarship that has explored the origins of the Sherman
Act has made clear, the law was very much a product of its time.89
The sentiment behind the law owes much of its strength to the classic
liberal concern about the coercive threat to others inherent in the pos-
session of power.90 The antitrust movement was also fueled by the tradi-
tional republican belief that civic virtue is the product of a society
comprised of independent, self-sufficient workers engaged in enterprises
of roughly equal size. 91 Finally, the formative years of antitrust were
shaped in important part by what James May has described as "a power-
ful, widely shared vision of a natural, rights-based political and economic
order that simultaneously tended to ensure opportunity, efficiency, pros-
perity, justice, harmony, and freedom."'92
This scholarship underscores how far we have come since that time.
The challenge is to learn what lessons the political history of antitrust
law teaches for today. An appreciation of its history requires that we
recognize the part of the background that is historically contingent, a
product of its times. More important, we must also identify those core
beliefs that inspired passage of the Sherman Act and legislation of 1914
and still retain their vitality today.
The antitrust laws grew out of a concern for competitive fairness.
Fairness is a concept derived from our beliefs in free will, responsibility,
autonomy, equality, and the indeterminacy of outcomes. While we no
longer believe in natural law, or feel quite the same way about a nation
of yeomanry, or fear that large business entities will invariably swallow
up the government and suffocate individual initiative, we still have very
strong (though frequently inarticulate) feelings about fairness. To the
extent that antitrust laws further what we consider to be fair, they vindi-
cate their purpose and reinforce our values.
89. E.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 1065; May, supra note 26, at 391-95; Millon, supra
note 26, at 1291; Scherer, supra note 26, at 255.
90. Millon, supra note 26, at 1236.
91. Id. at 1242-43.
92. May, supra note 26, at 391.
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C. From Theories to Rules
1. Defining the Structure of Fairness
In devising an approach to antitrust more faithful to its roots and
aspirations, the identification of competitive fairness as an important
goal is the easy part. What is more challenging is developing a set of
rules that incorporate fairness and efficiency and lead to principled and
predictable decision-making.
What do we mean when we talk about fairness? And under what
circumstances are legitimate claims of fairness likely to be invoked?
Fairness is a procedural concept derived from the principles of equal-
ity and autonomy. Its concerns may generally be summed up as equality
of opportunity. In the antitrust context, it finds meaning in the recogni-
tion of the rights and responsibilities of individual competitors. The con-
cept can be approached from four perspectives: the beginning
conditions for the competition, the competition itself as viewed from the
perspective of the firm, the competition as viewed from the perspective
of the market, and the consequences that flow from the results of the
competition.
The first perspective encompasses conditions preceding actual mar-
ket competition. Fairness dictates that, in general and within reason, all
firms are entitled to equal treatment in obtaining and utilizing the vari-
ous inputs that go into the final product or service offered. This idea is
grounded in equality and is equivalent to saying that all competitors
should begin at the same starting line.
The categories of antitrust claims that can invoke this component of
fairness include tie-in agreements, boycotts, exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, and price discrimination. With a tie-in, a firm is compelled to
purchase a product that it does not want. Boycotts and exclusive dealing
arrangements can prevent a firm from purchasing products that it wants.
And price discrimination forces a disadvantaged firm to pay more for its
products than its rivals when the difference in prices does not simply
reflect a supplier's different costs of doing business. In all four cases, the
practices are unfair because they saddle the victimized firm with an arti-
ficial handicap that can impede its ability to compete in the market on
equal terms with its rivals.
One view of how this first dimension of fairness has helped shape the
Robinson-Patman Act was expressed by Earl W. Kintner, a leading ad-
vocate and scholar of the statute, in 1976 congressional testimony:
[The] Act basically provides for equality of opportunity among
competing customers or purchasers of a product. There is noth-
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ing particularly obtuse about that; it is a very simple moral code,
in my opinion, that people should be treated fairly.... There is
no purpose in the Robinson-Patman Act to protect the inefficient,
ineffectual businessman, large or small, but only to provide busi-
nesses with equality of opportunity so that they can start the race,
the competitive race, on some basis of equality.93
This component of fairness also appeared to supply the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.94
Klor's, an independent retailer in San Francisco, was located next door
to one of the stores in the Broadway-Hale chain. Klor's claimed that
Broadway-Hale and "[ten] national manufacturers and their distribu-
tors" conspired "either not to sell to Klor's or to sell to it only at discrim-
inatory prices and highly unfavorable terms."95 The Supreme Court
characterized the alleged boycott as a per se violation of section 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, in large part because it "takes from Klor's its free-
dom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and drives it out
of business as a dealer in the defendants' products. '96
The second component of fairness pertains to the competition itself.
Within the range legitimately available to them, all firms are entitled to
choose for themselves the strategies they adopt to meet the competitive
challenge. This idea is grounded in autonomy and derives from the no-
tion that firms should be free to chart their own course since they have
to live with the results.
The major categories of antitrust claims that can invoke this compo-
nent of fairness consist of the full panoply of selling restrictions: resale
price maintenance, location clauses and other territorial restrictions, pro-
motional requirements, customer restrictions, and the like. If these re-
strictions are uniformly applied and freely agreed to, there is no
unfairness because the firm's autonomy has not been infringed. They
are unfair, however, when they are unilaterally imposed through the ex-
ercise of superior bargaining power or opportunistic behavior after the
relationship has begun. In this situation, they rob the victims of their
autonomy-their right to choose the competitive strategies that will de-
termine their success.
93. Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act, and
Related Matters of the House Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 260, 262
(1976) (testimony of Earl W. Kintner).
94. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
95. Id. at 208-09.
96. Id. at 213.
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The third component of fairness also pertains to the process of com-
petition. All firms are entitled to have their offerings considered objec-
tively and to receive the unbiased verdict of the marketplace. This idea
is also grounded in autonomy. It recognizes that while some competitors
will fail, those that do should be determined by the impersonal forces of
the market rather than by the exercise of a kind of power that displaces
the market's rewards and punishments.
Predatory pricing is one of the categories of antitrust claims that im-
plicates this component because it can lead to a market success or a mar-
ket failure that is unjustified in terms of a firm's costs and relative
efficiencies and thus interferes with competition on the merits. Also in-
cluded are the same buying restrictions that are relevant to the first com-
ponent, though here the emphasis is on the effects that such restrictions
have on a firm's potential customers rather than a firm's own right to
choose what products it will purchase. Tie-ins and exclusive dealing ar-
rangements are unfair from this perspective because they foreclose the
potential customers who are subject to the restrictions from freely con-
sidering the competitive merits of the products offered by other firms
seeking to compete in the market. They are unfair because they inter-
fere with the right of those firms to receive the unbiased verdict of the
marketplace.
The final component of fairness pertains to the outcome of the com-
petition. All firms are entitled to rewards commensurate with their level
of success in the market. This idea is grounded in equality and compre-
hends the basic notion that clear results fairly arrived at should be
respected.
This final component of fairness entails the protection of legitimate
expectations. It is consistent with the precept that rules should not be
changed in the middle of the game. For example, if a dealer competes
effectively and prospers, it generally should not find itself terminated by
its supplier. As Judge Learned Hand stated about monopolization: "The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
turned upon when he wins."97
Something akin to this component may have been at work in Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.9" and Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc..99 Both decisions are hard to square with
the Chicago approach. What is distinctive about the cases is that in both
97. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
98. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
99. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
19941
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
a powerful firm permitted rivals to compete and prosper in related mar-
kets and then pulled the rug out from under them. °" In this context, an
ounce of victim is often worth a pound of theory. Because it is often
implicated when plaintiffs have a compelling story to tell, the fourth
component of fairness has a prominent role to play in any more encom-
passing approach to antitrust.
2. Developing the New Rules
We know what the Chicagoans mean when they talk about efficiency.
We now have a better idea of what fairness means. How should courts
balance the two when they are confronted by real parties with real
disputes?
The first step is to assess the relative strength of the fairness concerns
that are raised by the actions challenged in the lawsuit. The foregoing
discussion demonstrates that a court need not resort to ad hoc intuitions
of right and wrong in compiling the fairness side of the ledger. Instead,
the court can compare that alleged to be unfair with the four compo-
nents of fairness. Do the challenged actions equip a rival with an advan-
tage attributable to factors outside the boundaries of the competitive
arena? Do they rob the plaintiff of its right to choose its own competi-
tive strategy? Do they prevent the plaintiff's offerings from being evalu-
ated impartially by its potential customers? Do they interfere with the
plaintiff's right to enjoy rewards commensurate with the verdict of the
marketplace?
If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then a genuine fairness
claim has likely been asserted. If the actions complained of caused the
plaintiff damage, then its claim is entitled to consideration. If the answer
to all four questions is no, then it is likely that the plaintiff was only a
victim of the competitive process, which is unfortunate from the plain-
tiff's perspective but not a problem that antitrust law remedies.
100. In Aspen Skiing, the defendant, which had come to control three of the four major
skiing facilities in Aspen, refused to continue to participate with the owner of the fourth facil-
ity in offering a popular six-day all-Aspen ski ticket and took additional actions that made it
difficult for the owner of the fourth facility to market its own multi-area package to replace
the joint offering. The Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the monopolization
claim of the owner of the fourth facility. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610-11.
In Kodak, Kodak adopted policies to prevent independent service organizations from ob-
taining replacement parts for Kodak copying equipment, with the apparent intent of driving
from the market the independent firms that had sprung up to provide service for the equip-
ment. The Supreme Court ruled that Kodak was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing
the monopolization or unlawful tie-in claims of the independent firms. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at
2092.
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If the plaintiff presents a legitimate fairness claim, then the court
must determine whether there is a genuine conflict between the relevant
fairness and efficiency considerations. Often there is not. Cartels proba-
bly provide the best example. Bork states that a per se rule against car-
tel agreements promotes efficiency since "it necessarily implies a
legislative decision that business units should prosper or decline, live or
die, according to their abilities to meet the desires of consumers."''1
The rule of per se liability is also consistent with preservation of the
opportunity to compete on fair and equal terms; it prohibits private
agreements that attempt to circumvent the judgment of the market. The
rule engenders confidence that those who succeed deserve their success.
An antitrust challenge to a horizontal agreement thus presents no con-
flict that requires balancing. The efficiency goal suggests that the combi-
nation should be illegal and the fairness goal likewise points to
condemnation."° As a result, recognition of competitive fairness as a
legitimate concern of antitrust law should not result in significant
changes in the first sphere of antitrust.
Competitive fairness likewise does not have a major role to play in
antitrust's second sphere. For example, challenges to mergers do not
present difficult balancing problems because in general mergers do not
properly raise fairness concerns. A merger may endow the surviving
firm with sufficient market power to exercise monopoly power. The ex-
ercise of that power to distort the competitive process would violate the
fairness ideal; the mere possession of the power would not. Indeed, if all
of the firms in a market voluntarily agreed to a merger, leaving the re-
sulting entity with a 100% share, there would be no problem from the
perspective of fairness, because no competing firm is victimized. Under
this approach, regulation of mergers should be governed by a sensible
efficiency analysis.
There are areas in the third sphere of antitrust where fairness and
efficiency concerns conflict. Resolving such conflicts is difficult. Bork is
correct in concluding that the authors and original supporters of the anti-
trust laws did not foresee the dilemma. 3 The supporters of the Sher-
man Act viewed the values they identified in their deliberations as
101. TiH Awrrus-r PARADOX, supra note 13, at 67.
102. See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422, 425 (1965) ("Since the various antitrust objectives tend to
converge in this instance, the blanket condemnation of cartels is perhaps the most solidly
based of all antitrust concepts.").
103. Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTRusT L.J.
21, 24 (1985).
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complementary and mutually reinforcing. 1°4 Thanks to the analytical
work of the Chicagoans, the extent to which the values may conflict has
been forcefully driven home.
When a genuine conflict exists, courts need not simply choose one
value over the other in the abstract. Instead, the challenge is to formu-
late rules for decision that incorporate burdens of proof and other evi-
dentiary requirements based on a sensitive assessment of the strength of
the competing fairness and efficiency claims. Such rules should focus the
inquiry on the material issues, impose evidentiary burdens on the party
best able to discharge them, leave room for the jury to resolve factual
disputes, and result in variable outcomes depending on the persuasive-
ness of the evidence.
Formulation of the rules requires critical assessment of the relative
strength of the competing claims in particular contexts. However, once
they are fashioned, courts may apply the rules to decide cases without a
constant need to re-examine first principles. Outcomes may be some-
what less predictable under a more encompassing approach than under
the Chicago School regime, but the task of judicial decision-making will
be no more difficult than in any other area of the law where competing
values shape the inquiry.
Dealer termination cases illustrate how this process might work.
Price-cutting dealers are sometimes terminated by their suppliers after
complaints from rival dealers about low prices. Beginning in the 1970s,
many terminated dealers brought claims under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, charging that their terminations were the result of illegal conspira-
cies between their suppliers and the complaining dealers." 5
Courts struggled with these cases because liability seemed to turn on
the motivation of the supplier, which is extremely difficult to prove. In
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,106 the Supreme
Court cleared up the ambiguities in the law by adopting close to a pure
Chicago School approach to the issues.
104. May, supra note 26, at 299.
105. See, e.g., Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1209-11 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1232
(7th Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 985-86 (8th
Cir. 1982), affd on reh'g, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1983); Davis-
Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1192-95 (6th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 946-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); Edward
J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
911 (1981); Trabert & Hoffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., 633 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1980);
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 165 (3d Cir. 1979).
106. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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The Court stated that the termination of a price-cutting dealer at the
insistence of a rival dealer, standing alone, does not necessarily result in
a reduction of competition and a decrease in output. Instead, the Court
thought that such a termination might plausibly be explained as a way of
protecting the complaining dealer from free riding by its price-cutting
rival and as a way of ensuring that the complaining dealer could afford
to provide the kind of presale services that the manufacturer thought
desirable.' 07
The Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that an agreement between a
manufacturer and one of its dealers to terminate another of its dealers
because of its low prices is not per se illegal unless the manufacturer and
complaining dealer also have an agreement on price or price levels.' 08
From a fairness perspective, Business Electronics is a perverse deci-
sion. Permitting a more powerful dealer to force a manufacturer to ter-
minate another dealer because of its low prices violates the fourth
component of fairness. It prevents the terminated dealer from having its
success determined by how well and efficiently it satisfies the demands
of its market and empowers another dealer to control its competitive
fate. This violates the concept of autonomy that underlies the notion of
fairness. This is an area that triggers a strong and deeply intuitive feeling
that the law simply is not fair.
A genuine conflict between the claims of fairness and efficiency may
seem present here. But requiring that each claim be backed up by evi-
dence could go a long way toward untangling the conflict in particular
situations.
As long as it acts in an even-handed manner, a supplier does not act
unfairly by terminating a dealer that has not lived up to its obligations,
even if the dealer offers lower prices. Similarly, it is not efficient for a
supplier to terminate a discounting dealer that is complying with the
terms of its distribution agreement in order to assuage a more powerful
dealer that is displeased with the prospect of price competition. Which
scenario more accurately describes the situation that has prompted liti-
gation should be up to the parties to prove.
The law frequently structures the presentation of evidence in this sort
of situation through formulation of a rule of decision that incorporates a
shifting proof scheme. Each party is assigned responsibility for produc-
ing evidence supporting the value it invokes in the litigation. The rule
107. ML at 724-25.
108. Id. at 735-36.
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
identifies the plaintiff's initial burden and establishes how the eviden-
tiary responsibilities shift as the case progresses.
One of the best-known examples of this process has emerged in the
employment discrimination field as an outgrowth of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.1 9 A similar approach may be appropriate here. Follow-
ing the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, a plaintiff dealer claiming that it
was terminated pursuant to an illegal agreement between its supplier
and one or more rival dealers might first be required to establish a prima
facie case that the termination was the result of an anticompetitive
agreement.
The plaintiff could establish its prima facie case by offering evidence
that it was terminated after complaints about its low prices from other
dealers and that there was no obvious shortcoming in its performance.
Thus, the type of showing that the Supreme Court ruled insufficient to
support a verdict in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp."' would
suffice to get the plaintiff over its first evidentiary hurdle.
If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, then the burden of produc-
tion (not proof) would shift to the defendant to articulate a permissible
efficiency based justification for the termination. For example, the de-
fendant could come forward with evidence that the plaintiff dealer was
not providing the level of presale service that the supplier had required,
but was free riding on the sales efforts of the complaining dealer. This
step incorporates efficiency concerns into the proof scheme. However,
rather than simply accepting an efficiency explanation as a matter of
faith, the court would require the defendant to identify the basis for the
theory and open the way for evidence on the issue.
If the defendant satisfies its burden of production, then the plaintiff
must prove that the reason offered by the defendant is only a pretext for
what was in reality a termination carried out pursuant to an anticompeti-
tive agreement with the complaining dealer."
The jury will be confronted with competing explanations for the ter-
mination. The plaintiff will claim that it was terminated because the sup-
plier responded to the complaints of a more powerful dealer that did not
want to compete on price. The defendant will argue that the termination
was caused by nothing more sinister than the plaintiff's contractual
shortcomings. With the issue thus joined, the jury must decide whether
the plaintiff discharged its burden of proof.
109. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
110. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
111. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
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Following traditional conspiracy law concepts, the plaintiff should be
required to prove more than the fact that complaints about prices were
followed by termination. To this extent, Monsanto should remain good
law. But the plaintiff should not be restricted in the ways it may go
about proving its case. The terminated dealer should not be required to
come up with the equivalent of an admission of the supplier that it had
simply caved-in to the pricing complaints of another dealer. It may be
enough, for example, for the dealer to prove that the supplier's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." 2 Other methods of proof may be
appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
Contrary to the holding in Sharp, there should be no requirement
that the complaining dealer reached an agreement on prices with the
supplier. Once the terminated dealer is recognized as an appropriate
object of concern under antitrust law, there is no reason to require a
further agreement on price as a way of locating the kind of effect on
output that Chicago School advocates recognize as the only legitimate
basis for antitrust liability.
The value of this approach to dealer termination cases is that it estab-
lishes as wrongful a termination prompted by a rival dealer's complaints
about low prices. It affirms the idea of autonomy that underlies the con-
cept of competitive fairness. At the same time, the approach recognizes
efficiency justifications for the termination of even low-price dealers. It
simply requires the supplier to articulate them, which seems reasonable
since the supplier is the one that best knows the reasons for the termina-
tion. The dealer is relieved of the unnatural burden of producing evi-
dence that is uniquely within the supplier's control. This approach,
based on shifting burdens, establishes a proof scheme that is far more
compatible with the search for truth than the theoretical framework of
questionable but nonrebuttable presumptions that characterizes the law
today.
112. In Burdine, the Supreme Court explained that in the employment discrimination
context, a plaintiff can prove that the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions
is a pretext "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.
Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993), the Court explained that the fact-finder's rejection of the employer's
explanation for its adverse employment action affecting the plaintiff permits but does not com-
pel a finding of discrimination within the meaning of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). A similar permissible inference is ap-
propriate in the dealer termination context.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law in antitrust's third sphere is profoundly
unsatisfying. The deeper resonances of the law have been abandoned in
favor of a mean-spirited approach that is inconsistent with the will of
Congress, unrealistic and unreliable in its assumptions, and virtually un-
yielding in its conclusion that whoever seeks to invoke the law's protec-
tions deserved the fate it suffered.
Something is missing. Few seriously dispute that intuitive notions of
fairness played a significant role in the formation of antitrust law. The
issue is not whether fairness has relevance to antitrust or whether there
really is any left side of antitrust at all, but rather whether there is any
principled way to take fairness into account. The challenge is to articu-
late a sensible concept of fairness that can be integrated with efficiency
concerns in some coherent and workable fashion.
The necessary synthesis is not easy, but there is no reason why the
sensitive balancing of important social interests should be easy. Chicago
School advocates arrived at their simpler rules by assuming away the
problem's complexity. They have done valuable work on the efficiency
half of the equation, the right side, but a more faithful approach to anti-
trust requires that the fairness component, the left side, now receive
equal consideration and that both concerns be integrated into workable
rules that can be invoked to decide real cases. The process of formulat-
ing these new rules is the next step in the evolution of antitrust.
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